FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Volume 16

Issue 1

Article 2

2017

They Should Be Fired: The Social Regulation of Free Speech in the
U.S.
Franciska A. Coleman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Franciska A. Coleman, They Should Be Fired: The Social Regulation of Free Speech in the U.S., 16 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 1 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr/vol16/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in First Amendment Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

THEY SHOULD BE FIRED: THE SOCIAL
REGULATION OF FREE SPEECH IN THE U.S.
*

Dr. Franciska A. Coleman
ABSTRACT

The debate over First Amendment jurisprudence often assumes
that the First Amendment reflects a choice of non-regulation
over regulation. This article suggests, however, that it is more
accurate to describe the First Amendment as reflecting a choice
of social regulation over legal regulation. Social regulation of
speech has generally been lauded and preferred in America for
its autonomy-enhancing properties, as private parties in civil
society often lack the overwhelming power of a government
censor. A review of recent high-profile incidents of social
speech regulation, however, suggests that the ubiquity of social
media and the hegemony of corporations have increased the
breadth, visibility, and mechanisms of social speech regulation
to such an extent that its scope can now approach that of a government censor. These mechanisms generally entail economic
pressure on corporations, designed to force them to fire and ostracize employees who engage in censorable, contested, or discreditable speech. While the level of offensiveness of these types
of speech is not the same, the sanction often is the same—loss
of livelihood. This article argues that if the expected benefits of
social speech regulation in an era of social media are not to be
outweighed by losses in citizen autonomy, an approach to social regulation that includes legal protections against domination is required, beginning in the crucibles of free speech —
public schools and universities.
"Those who won our independence believed that . . . freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth . . . [T]hey knew that . . . fear
breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss

*

Franciska A. Coleman, Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law School: Charles Hamilton
Houston Institute; Assistant Professor, Yonsei Law School.

2

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting
remedy for evil counsels is good ones." 1
INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the Chick-fil-A fast food chain was the object of
a customer boycott, 2 and several colleges rescinded offers for
the franchise to open branches on their campuses. 3 Some
mayors promised to deny licenses for the chain’s expansion into
their cities, 4 and at one local franchise, an artist defaced the
walls of the restaurant with protest graffiti.5
In 2017, Kathy Griffin was fired from CNN.6 Less than
a week later, all the bookings for her Celebrity Run Ins comedy
tour had been cancelled, 7 as had her public appearance with
Senator Al Franken.8 Her endorsement deal with Squatty Potty
was revoked,9 and the President and First Lady of the United
States called her sick and mentally ill.10

1

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See Lawrence B. Glickman, Chick-fil-A Day a Reminder That Boycotts Often Backfire,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 3, 2012, 12:37 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2012-08-03/chick-fil-a-day-a-reminderthat-boycotts-often-backfire.
3
See Queer Voices, Chick-Fil-A Scrapped By Northeastern University After Students Object
to Company’s ‘Anti-Gay’ Support, HUFFPOST (Feb. 29, 2012, 6:23 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/29/chick-fil-a-franchise-northeasternuniversity-scrapped_n_1311755.html.
4
See Kim Severson, Chick-fil-A Thrust Back Into Spotlight on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES
(July 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/26/us/gay-rights-uproar-overchick-fil-a-widens.html.
5
See Anna Almendrala, Chick-Fil-A in Torrance, Calif., Graffitied with ‘Tastes Like Hate’,
HUFFPOST (Aug. 3, 2012, 3:16 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/03/chick-fil-a-graffititorrance_n_1738807.html?utm_hp_ref=gayvoices&ir=Gay%20Voices&ncid=edlinkusaolp00000008.
6
See Aric Jenkins, CNN Fires Kathy Griffin Following Controversial Donald Trump Photo,
TIME (May 31, 2017), http://time.com/4799905/cnn-fires-kathy-griffin-donaldtrump-photo/.
7
See Jennifer Drysdale, Kathy Griffin’s Final Tour Date Canceled [sic] Amid Donald
Trump Drama, ET (June 2, 2017, 5:20 PM)
http://www.etonline.com/news/218923_kathy_griffin_final_tour_date_cancel_ed_a
mid_donald_trump_drama/.
8
See Burgess Everett, Franken Backtracks, Cancels Event With Comedian Griffin After
Trump Photo Controversy, POLITICO (June 1, 2017, 9:48 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/01/al-franken-kathy-griffin-cancels-event239047.
9
See Stephanie Nolasco, Kathy Griffin Dumped by Squatty Potty, Lambasted by Trump
Family Over Photo with Bloody Head, FOX NEWS (May 31, 2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2017/05/31/squatty-potty-drops-kathy2
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Their offense—speech. Dan Cathy, CEO of Chick-fil-A,
publicly stated that he supports a biblical definition of marriage,11 and Kathy Griffin posed with a photo of a severed and
bloody Donald Trump head.12 Dan Cathy, Kathy Griffin, and
the sea of newly unemployed speech offenders stretching between them, reveal an oft-overlooked truth about American free
speech. It is not free. It is not subject to government regulation,
but it nevertheless costs money, jobs, and livelihoods.
The debate over First Amendment jurisprudence often
assumes that the First Amendment reflects a choice of nonregulation over regulation. This article suggests, however, that
it is more accurate to describe the First Amendment as reflecting a choice of social regulation over legal regulation. Social regulation of speech has generally been lauded and preferred in
America for its autonomy-enhancing properties, 13 as private
parties in civil society often lack the overwhelming power of a
government censor. A review of recent high profile incidents of
social speech regulation, however, suggests that the ubiquity of
social media and the hegemony of corporations have increased
the breadth, visibility, and mechanisms of social speech regulation to such an extent that its scope now rivals that of a government censor.14 Thus, if the expected benefits of social speech
regulation in an era of social media are not to be outweighed by
losses in citizen autonomy, an approach to social regulation
that includes legal protections against domination is required,
beginning in the crucibles of free speech— public schools and
universities.
This article is divided into four parts. Part I of this article
provides a brief historical overview of how similar concerns for

griffin-after-photo-shoot-with-bloodied-trump-mask-secret-service-to-investigate-saysreport.html.
10
See NBC News (@NBCNews), First Lady Melania Trump Issues Statement on Kathy
Griffin “Beheading” Photo, TWITTER (May 31, 2017, 8:26 AM),
https://twitter.com/nbcnews/status/869938224835305473?lang=en.
11
See Jena McGregor, Chick-fil-A CEO Dan Cathy Steps Into Gay-Marriage Debate,
WASH. POST (July 19, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postleadership/post/chick-fil-a-president-dan-cathy-bites-into-gay-marriagedebate/2012/07/19/gJQACrvzvW_blog.html?utm_term=.91ae6ecf468c.
12
See Lauren Huff, Kathy Griffin's Controversial Trump Photo Featured in New GOP Ad,
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (June 1, 2017),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/kathy-griffins-controversial-trumpphoto-featured-new-gop-ad-1009692.
13
See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146–47 (1943) (noting the constitutional importance of leaving to individuals the choice of whether to receive or reject
information).
14
See infra Section III.
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minority groups led the United States and Europe to adopt different approaches to speech regulation—the U.S. adopted social regulation of offensive speech while Europe opted for legal
regulation. Part II discusses the theory of the social regulation
of speech, focusing on the values underlying the U.S. free
speech regime and the ways in which social regulation of
speech is believed to serve those values. Part III discusses the
practice of the social regulation of speech in the U.S., describing the increasingly corporate mechanisms of social speech regulation and the negative side effects of such regulation on citizen autonomy. Part IV addresses the law of social speech regulation, proposing changes in the way the First Amendment is
applied to speech in public schools and universities as a first
step to making the social regulation of speech more compatible
with the goals of self-government and autonomy. This section
advocates privileging public schools and universities, not as
spaces of noninterference with speech, but as spaces in which
citizens learn to engage in the social regulation of speech without domination.
I. BACKGROUND
In the earliest days of free speech protections, the relationship between free speech and costly speech was determined
by the common law of libel and the prohibition on prior restraints.15 According to Blackstone,
The liberty of the press . . . consist[s] in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not
in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every
freeman has an undoubted right to
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public. . . but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous,
or illegal, he must take the consequence . . . ”16

15

See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713–14 (1931).
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 567–68 (1993) (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151–52).
16
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This meant that while the government could not prohibit publication in the first instance, it could impose penalties after the
fact for libelous or seditious publications, broadly defined. For
centuries, the Blackstonian view of free speech was shared by
both American and European democracies.17 However, as the
world’s democracies became more racially and religiously diverse, they were forced to redefine freedom of speech, and that
redefinition evolved in very different ways on the two sides of
the Atlantic. For, in the 1960s, the rise of antisemitism in Europe and growing opposition to the Civil Rights Movement in
the U.S. placed the European and U.S. democracies on very
different trajectories in addressing offensive speech.
In Europe, growing antisemitism led to the creation and
ratification of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). 18 The ICCPR
prohibits “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence,”19
while the ICERD obligates state parties to make the “dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred [and] incitement to racial discrimination” punishable by law.20 The ICCPR and ICERD were not ratified by the U.S. until almost 30
years later,21 with reservations rejecting any obligation to regulate hate speech.22 In much of Europe, however, the Covenant
and Convention were ratified without reservation much earlier,23 and recent local efforts have strengthened and expanded

17

GEOFFREY STONE ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1029 (7th ed. 2013) (noting that
colonial assemblies imitated Parliament in vigorously punishing “seditious” expression).
18
See generally Christian Tomuschat, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT’L LAW,
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/iccpr/iccpr_e.pdf (last visited Sep. 12, 2017).
19
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 14668
U.N.T.S. 999.
20
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 9464 U.N.T.S. 660.
21
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 23, 1 (102d Sess. 1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 645 (1992); U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140
Cong. Rec. S7634-02 (daily ed., June 24, 1994)
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/usdocs/racialres.html.
22
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 23, 1 (102d Sess. 1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 645 (1992).
23
Office of the High Commissioner, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
UNITED NATIONS,
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the core prohibitions of these agreements. 24 For example, in
2008, the European Union issued a framework decision requiring members to use criminal sanctions to deter individuals who
“publicly incite[] violence or hatred” on the basis of “race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin.”25 Similarly,
in May, 2016, concerns about internet hate speech led the European Commission and key IT companies to adopt a code of
conduct designed to ensure prompt removal of online hate
speech.26
The trajectory in the U.S. has been dramatically different, due in large part to the seminal decision in New York Times
v. Sullivan.27 The Sullivan case concerned a full page ad placed
in the Times by civil rights activists in 1960.28 The ad sought
support for students in Southern states engaged in non-violent
protests.29 It asserted that the students were being met with an
“unprecedented wave of terror” in their efforts to uphold the
guarantees in the Bill of Rights.30 In subsequent paragraphs, the
ad set forth several specific examples of the “wave of terror,”
such as expelling students, ringing the school with shotguncarrying police, padlocking the dining hall to starve students
into submission, and arresting Dr. King seven times and bombing his home.31 Though the Supreme Court acknowledged that
several of the facts alleged in the ad were false,32 thus bringing it
within the scope of the common law of libel,33 it nevertheless
held that awarding Sullivan half a million dollars in damages
for his claim violated the First Amendment.34 In so doing, the
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx (last visited
Sep. 12, 2017).
24
Office of the High Commissioner, UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Publishes Findings on Canada, Djibouti, Ecuador, Kuwait, New Zealand, Russian
Federation, Tajikistan and United Arab Emirates, UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 28, 2017),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=2200
2&LangID=E.
25
The Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia, EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/racism-xenophobia/frameworkdecision/index_en.htm (last visited Sep. 12, 2017).
26
European Commission and IT Companies Announce Code of Conduct in Illegal Online
Hate Speech, EUROPEAN COMM’N (May 31, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-16-1937_en.htm.
27
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28
Id. at 256.
29
Id. at 256–257.
30
Id. at 256.
31
Id. at 257–58.
32
Id. at 258–59 (noting, for example, that Dr. King was arrested four times, not the
seven times alleged).
33
Id. at 277.
34
Id. at 264.
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Court noted that the First Amendment must be interpreted in
light of the “profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” 35 While the Court had in other areas suggested
that exaggeration, vilification, and even false statement in the
realm of religious and political debate were a small price to pay
for the public deliberation at the heart of democracy,36 New York
Times v. Sullivan was the most radical extension of this principle, holding as it did that the traditional common law rules of
libel were, in fact, unconstitutional. 37
One central reason for this sweeping constitutionalization of the common law was the increasing use of libel suits to
silence civil rights activists in the South and to punish the
Northern newspapers critical of the South’s violent reprisals
against protestors.38 Few would disagree that the ability to use
libel law to bankrupt civil rights leaders and a sympathetic
Northern press would have had an enormous negative effect on
the nascent Civil Rights Movement. 39 Thus, the original approach in Sullivan made historical sense. Over the course of the
subsequent half-century, however, the elaboration of the principles enunciated in the Sullivan case has created significant constitutional barriers to the regulation of hate speech in the U.S.
One of the most significant of those barriers was erected in
1992, in the case of R.A.V. v. St. Paul.40 In this case, the Court
overturned a criminal sanction for cross-burning.41 It held that
the statute sanctioning speech and symbols reasonably guaranteed to “arouse[] anger, alarm or resentment in others on the

35

Id. at 270.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
37
See generally Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254.
38
John Bruce Lewis & Bruce L. Ottley, New York Times v. Sullivan at 50: Despite
Criticism, the Actual Malice Standard Still Provides "Breathing Space" for Communications
in the Public Interest, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 2–3, 9–11 (2014).
39
See id. at 63.
40
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
41
Id. at 396.
36

8

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender” 42 violated the
First Amendment’s prohibition on viewpoint discrimination.43
Thus, in order to protect against anti-Semitism, European nations adopted speech regulations designed to protect dignity and promote tolerance.44 On the other hand, in order to
protect the nascent Civil Rights movement, U.S. courts constitutionalized libel laws and discouraged regulation of speech.45
To use another framework, Europeans dealt with anti-Semitism
by leveling up, according all citizens the respect and dignity of
aristocrats.46 The U.S., on the other hand, dealt with the racist
use of libel law by leveling down, denying all citizens any legal
claim to civility and respect.47 As a result, these days, though
the speech regimes in both nations can be linked to their antidiscrimination efforts in the 1960s, speech regulations common
in many European nations are largely unconstitutional in the
U.S.48
This has led some to suggest that American free speech
protection is absolute49 and that the U.S. does not regulate offensive speech.50 This is not true. As discussed in the next section, the U.S. regulates free speech through social rather than
legal mechanisms, due to the belief that social regulation best
advances the goals of self-government, truth-seeking, and selfexpression.51

42

Id. at 380. Specifically, the statute provided that “whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but
not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.” Id.
43
Id. at 395–96.
44
Office of the High Commissioner, supra note 24.
45
See generally, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
46
Adrienne Stone, 'Insult and Emotion, Calumny and Invective': Twenty Years of Freedom
of Political Communication 19 (Melbourne Law Sch., Working Paper No. 565, 2011).
47
Id.
48
Compare Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (holding that civil liability for protest signs that deliberately insulted grieving families violated the First Amendment),
with Public Order Act 1986 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/64
(creating liability for the “stirring up of racial hatred” that includes prohibitions on
harassment, and threats).
49
Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U L. REV. 865, 874 (1960).
50
See Eugene Volokh, No, There’s No “Hate Speech” Exception to the First Amendment,
WASH. POST (May 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/no-theres-no-hate-speech-exception-to-the-firstamendment/?utm_term=.1405de0dd17a.
51
See infra Section II.
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II. GOALS OF FREE SPEECH AND SOCIAL REGULATION
This section provides a brief summary of the three primary values underlying the preference for the social regulation
of offensive speech in the U.S.—self-government, truth seeking,
and self-expression. It also discusses the ideal of social regulation of speech as the best way to support and affirm these goals.
A. Values Underlying Free Speech
One of the primary values underlying free speech is
democratic self-government. According to Robert Post, Dean of
Yale Law School, the right of self-government is best understood as a right of authorship— a right to share in the making
of the laws governing society through equal participation in
public discourse and debate about those laws and policies.52 As
James Madison noted, however, in this process, “the censorial
power is in the people over the Government, and not in the
Government over the people.”53 Under this view, the government’s obligation to ensure political equality among citizens
advocating for their respective policy preferences requires it to
accord equal status to the various ideas proposed by its citizens. 54 This precludes censoring the ideas of some citizens
based on subjective criteria, or treating some citizens more or
less favorably due to their policy ideas or political advocacy.55
This equality of ideas, however, is limited to public discourse,
normatively defined.56
If the government may engage in subjective censorship
on the grounds of offense, however, it can limit the options and
solutions citizens are permitted to discuss to those that favor its
views,57 for “offensive” is a term of inherently flexible and arbitrary boundaries. 58 It creates a broad space within which the
government could have final say over citizen deliberation and
52

Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482
(2011).
53
Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Dec. 4, 1794) (available at
https://cdn.loc.gov/service/mss/mjm/05/05_0799_0804.pdf).
54
See Post, supra note 53, at 485.
55
See id.
56
Id. at 484–485 (limiting his equality of ideas argument to public discourse).
57
Bo Zhao, Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous Privacy: History, Censorship, Law, and Culture, 42 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 39, 89 (2014) (explaining
how government censorship of offensive speech might create further censorship of
other ideas and explorations that are a natural part of a democracy).
58
See Eric M. Ruben, Justifying Perceptions in First and Second Amendment Doctrine, 80
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 160 (2017) (noting that it is difficult to distinguish
between offensive speech and impermissible animus toward a particular viewpoint).

10

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

criticism, in the name of preventing offensive speech.59 The interests of those in power in maintaining their power makes such
a subjective censorial power susceptible to abuse.60 It also underscores the need for the citizenry to retain the power to
change their government and governors at will. 61 As these
changes require collective acts, self-government relies heavily
upon the ability of the polity to engage in free and uninhibited
discussion and criticism of the government of the day. 62 For
these reasons, U.S. courts have sometimes treated political
speech, speech touching upon the practice of self-government,
as entitled to more robust protection than non-political
speech.63 However, the difficulty of distinguishing between political and non-political speech in the first instance, and the fact
that ordinary speech is seldom wholly one or the other, complicates such a hierarchical ordering.64
A second fundamental reason for prohibiting government regulation of offensive speech is closely related to the
first—the truth-seeking rationale. This idea rests on the inevitable fallibility of human beings and the value of reason-giving.
According to this view, silencing dissenting views, even in the
name of preventing hate speech, may silence an unrecognized
truth and thus deprive society of an opportunity for advancement.65 The case of Galileo and the Catholic Church is a quin59

See Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1458 (2017) (explaining
that citizens require adequate structures for public discourse to maintain a selfgoverning society and to have autonomy in their speech and decisions).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964).
63
See generally David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection
of Self-Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 90 (2017) (describing how the truthseeking rationale is based upon the idea that the truth will emerge “from an open
clash of conflicting ideas and opinions”). Compare Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443,
451–52, 453 (2011) (finding that speech “relating to any matter of political . . . concern to the community” constitutes speech that is of public concern, which lies “at
the heart of the First Amendment’s protection”) with Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) (noting that “speech on matters of purely
private concern is of less First Amendment concern” than speech concerning public
matters).
64
See e.g., Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453–55 (explaining that determining whether speech is
political or not depends on an evaluation of the content, form, and context of the
speech and that each unique circumstance must be examined because what might be
considered political speech in one evaluative criteria’s circumstances might not be so
in another).
65
“[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing
the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from
the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is
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tessential example of the dangers of silencing an unrecognized
truth.66 However, this view also finds value in erroneous dissenting views.67 For, even erroneous dissenting views challenge
taken-for-granted truths and force deliberation and reasongiving in the defense of those truths.68 The process of reasongiving strengthens the power and legitimacy of the challenged
truths.69 Thus, at the heart of the truth-seeking rationale is the
belief that no individual or single group of individuals, limited
as s/he is by her socio-cultural context, is able to flawlessly differentiate between truth and error, between noxious ideas and
those that will redound to the good of the polity.70 This approach suggests that the value of an idea over time, its effect on
the mores and social welfare of society, is always a posteriori
knowledge, never a priori knowledge. The only way to know the
value of an idea to a society over time is to allow that idea to
percolate in society over time—to create a free and open marketplace of ideas.
Many advocates of hate speech regulation, however, are
not directly attempting to exclude noxious ideas from the marketplace of ideas a priori, but rather to set boundaries on the
manner in which such ideas are given expression in public fora.
Even this more limited approach to speech regulation poses a
problem for the marketplace of ideas by making class a gatekeeper for access to the marketplace. As was observed in the
debate over England’s blasphemy laws, “what it really comes to
is that, where opinions are strongly held by an educated man,
those opinions will be expressed in a way in which the law can-

almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.” JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 33 (David Spitz
ed., W. W. Norton 1975) (1859)); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–
76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (commenting that the Founders, among other
things, “believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensible to the discovery and spread of political truth” and that “they
eschewed silence coerced by law”).
66
Jon D. Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 129,
206 (2003) (quoting Galileo's abjuration, in which he disavows his theory that the
earth is a sphere and condemns his own findings as heresy to avoid further torture by
the church's inquisitors).
67
“[I]f [the suppressed opinion is] wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit,
the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error.” MILL, supra note 66.
68
Id.
69
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375–76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
70
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (“[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe . . . that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas.”).
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not touch, while those expressed by an uneducated man, simply
because he is uneducated, will come under the penalties law.”71
Moreover, given that normative standards of civility are never
fixed, but are always in process and evolving, the law must constantly choose whose norms and whose version of civility to
impose upon all of society.72 Robert Post argues that the law
invariably chooses the norms of the dominant group,73 placing
all others under a disadvantage in the marketplace of ideas.
While the issue of hegemony must necessarily infect all laws in
a society based on majority rule, in Post’s view, there is a material and problematic difference between imposing dominant
cultural speech norms and the imposing of other cultural norms
reified in law.74 One way to account for this hierarchical ordering of the acceptability of hegemony would be the view of democracy as “government by discussion,” making equality in the
marketplace of ideas one of the most essential aspects of equality.
During the years before widespread internet use, when
access to broadcast media was beyond the reach of most ordinary people, it would have been difficult to argue that a marketplace of ideas to which the general citizenry could contribute
actually existed. The ability of ordinary citizens to speak out in
ways that would meaningfully impact public deliberation was
greatly circumscribed by high barriers to entry into the communication market.75 Moreover, access to audiences was skewed
along axes of wealth and power; for media that provided access
to the largest audiences were also the most expensive. Thus,
critiques of power and alternative narratives were silenced in
many ways by the cost of access to broadcast technologies. In
the Web 2.0 era,76 however, our technology has finally caught
up with our theoretical frameworks, and almost anyone with a
mobile phone can shop their ideas in a global marketplace.
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Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 131 (Ivan Hare &
James Weinstein ed., 2009).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 132–33 (arguing that speech norms are analogous to religious truths and thus,
the government must be required to be neutral among the many speech communities
competing for dominance).
75
April Mara Major, Norm Origin and Development in Cyberspace: Models of Cybernorm
Evolution, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 101 (2000) (comparing the ease of internet communication with the high entry barriers of print publishing and broadcast media).
76
See generally Mike Wolcott, What is Web 2.0?, CBS: MONEY WATCH (May 1, 2008),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-web-20/ (explaining in depth the Web 2.0
era).
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While name recognition and wealth continue to play a role,
they are not prerequisites for an idea to “go viral.”77 Ordinary
people can capture the attention of a global audience with little
more than an idea and an internet connection. They can endorse the government or attack the government, call for cooperation or call for discrimination. In the internet era, barriers to
audience access have been rendered largely obsolete, and the
space for counter-speech 78 is far more coextensive with the
space occupied by dominant narratives than at almost any other
point in our history.79 As will be discussed later, however, both
the marketplace idea and the self-government idea contain certain presuppositions about the buoyancy of good ideas (they
will rise to the top) and the nature of the citizenry (they have
the critical capacity and engagement to distinguish between
good and bad ideas) that have not always been borne out in
practice.80
The third rationale supporting social regulation of offensive speech lies in the concept of human autonomy, and construes the right of self-expression as a necessary aspect of realizing that autonomy. This idea relies on notions of the rational
human being whose capacity for expression is central to the realization of her highest human functioning.81 It places a premium on “the notion of self-respect that comes from a mature person's full and untrammeled exercise of capacities central to human rationality.”82 Under this view, freedom of speech is essential to the expression of personality and identity.83 Studies on
the links between language and identity are innumerable and
suggest that language and other means of self-expression play a
fundamental role not only in the construction but in the actual77

Nancy Fox, Leverage Your Online Opportunities, 34 No. 2 LAW PRAC. 16, 16 (2008)
(explaining that when something is viral it “spreads rapidly and exponentially”).
78
Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old Remedy for “Bad” Speech, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 553, 554 (2000) (defining counterspeech as
speech designed to remedy or counter “bad” speech).
79
However, the recent proposed changes in net neutrality laws may narrow that
space. See Olivia Solon, Ajit Pai: The Man Who Could Destroy the Open Internet, THE
GUARDIAN (July 12, 2017, 7:42 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/12/ajit-pai-fcc-net-neutralityopen-internet (enumerating the Trump Administration’s attempts to chip away at net
neutrality).
80
See infra Section III.
81
David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward A Moral Theory of the
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62–63 (1974).
82
Id. at 62.
83
See Adrienne Stone, Defamation of Public Figures: North American Contrasts, 50 N.Y.
L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 24 (2006) (noting the importance of free speech to the expression
of individual identity and personality development).
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ization of identities. 84 Accordingly, protection of freedom of
speech as self-expression is essential to an individual’s ability to
promote her own development and to control her destiny
through autonomous decision-making.85 As a result, under the
strong version of this view, restrictions on the types of communications human beings can receive, send, or be exposed to expresses contempt for human rationality and fundamentally disrespects the idea of individual sovereignty.86
Moreover, while Supreme Court precedent treats the
self-expression rationale as subordinate to those of selfgovernment and truth-seeking,87 it has been argued that this rationale is actually the highest and most important objective of
the First Amendment.88 According to this argument, the reason
self-government and truth-seeking are important is because they
are the most conducive to individual development and selfrealization. 89 Thus, the self-realization rationale itself should
rank higher in a lexicographical ordering than the mere means
to the goal of self-realization. While U.S. jurisprudence has yet
to go this far, it has consistently acknowledged that a fundamental goal of the First Amendment is to protect rights of selfexpression.90
B. Social Regulation Affirms and Preserves these Goals
This section discusses the idealized defense of social
speech regulation and the ways it is believed to promote and
preserve the values of self-government, truth-seeking, and selfexpression.
First, social regulation preserves self-government by entrusting the regulatory power over speech to the people themselves, rather than to the government. This makes it difficult for
the government to undermine popular self-determination by
usurping the mechanisms of public discussion and directing
84

JAMES PAUL GEE, AN INTRODUCTION TO DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: THEORY AND
METHOD 141 (2d ed. 2005).
85
Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 625–26 (1982).
86
See Richards, supra note 82, at 62.
87
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“[R]estricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting
speech on matters of public interest.”).
88
Redish, supra note 86, at 593.
89
Id. at 594.
90
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (explaining that protection of self-expression is a “fundamental concern of the First
Amendment”); see also Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. Public Serv. Comm’n of
New York, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2 (1980) (stating that an interest in self-expression is
protected by the First Amendment freedom of speech provisions).
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them toward the promotion of its own self-interest.91 For, if the
government cannot control the types of speech that enter the
public forum, it cannot bias reporting and media toward its
own goals and positions. It also cannot silence dissent or insulate incumbents from criticism. The earliest history of America
demonstrates that the line between unpopular political speech
and speech that is injurious to society is an extremely subjective
one, susceptible to abuse.92 The strong First Amendment limitations on governmental policing of speech seeks to reduce the
risks of such abuse by placing the power to censor in private,
rather than public hands—thus limiting the degree to which the
government can manipulate speech restrictions as a means of
enhancing its own power. For, with its vast resources and expansive police powers, the government can force national conformity through ignorance and mistake, and then prevent remediation by foreclosing dissenting speech across all communicative media. Private censorship, on the other hand, is assumed
to be partial and community-based, with private censors unable
to control the national speech market. Thus, citizens continue
to have access to opposing views in some fora, allowing for at
least the possibility of dialogue and improvement—of the minority persuading the majority through appeals to public reason. Such avenues would be foreclosed by a fully centralized
silencing of dissent. Thus, private censorship seems to allow a
more partial and fluid regulation of offensive speech.
Similarly, in the idealized version, social regulation of
offensive speech safeguards the marketplace of ideas, while
government regulation of offensive speech would undermine
the truth-seeking and legitimacy rationales at the heart of that
ideal. 93 For example, one assumption of the truth-seeking ra-

91

Alexander Miklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
256 (1961).
92
The history of the Alien and Sedition Acts seems to illustrate this point. Passed in
1798, these Acts were a response to concerns about the French Revolution and potential war with France. The Alien Act allowed the President to deport aliens
deemed “suspicious,” while the Sedition Act punished the writing, uttering, or publishing of “any false, scandalous or malicious . . . writings” against the government
or President “with intent to defame them or to bring them ‘into contempt or disrepute. . . or to excite against them . . . the hatred of the good people of the United
States.’” Nancy Murray & Sarah Wunsch, Civil Liberties in Times of Crisis: Lessons from
History, 87 MASS. L. REV. 72, 73 (2002). These Acts were used to jail political opponents and to silence criticism of the Federalist President and his allies in Congress.
See James Morton Smith, President John Adams, Thomas Cooper, and Sedition: A Case
Study in Suppression, 42 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 438, 438 (1995).
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See e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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tionale is that the truth is more likely to be the product of more
speech rather than less speech—of open deliberation and debate
rather than debate constrained by subjective limitations on
which ideas can be presented and how they can be presented.
While private actors can and do censor speech, their reach is far
more limited than that of the government, for private actors can
only force speakers to seek out another venue, while the government can force speakers out of the marketplace entirely.
Thus, private regulation is more supportive of the “more
speech” paradigm, for it functions to ensure that so long as an
idea has proponents, however few, it will never completely disappear from the marketplace. Whether this is truly a good, given the argument that some ideas SHOULD disappear from the
marketplace, leads to the second rationale for the truth-seeking
marketplace —legitimacy of process. This approach argues that
even ideas which time and public deliberation have shown to be
noxious should be allowed in the marketplace, because laws
imposed on a silenced minority, unable to speak in their defense, are inherently illegitimate.94 Thus, the legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws rest in part on racists having a fair opportunity to express their views and argue for their ideas in the
court of public opinion.95 In this construction of legitimacy, the
rejection of the views of the racist must be a function of the independent rejection of their arguments by the myriad private
parties to whom they are addressed, rather than the wholesale
national silencing of their views by the government.96 The legitimacy view is not without its detractors,97 but the approach taken by the U.S. thus far is to encourage counterspeech and to
allow private actors to affirm or reject competing ideas through
economic sanctions.98
Lastly, social regulation of speech is considered more
compatible with the autonomy or freedom of expression rationale. For example, as demonstrated in the discussion of the
self-government and truth-seeking rationales above, social regulation of speech generally allows a more diverse range of viewpoints and expression than legal regulation, due to its local and
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Ronald Dworkin, Foreword in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACy, at viii–ix (Ivan
Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009).
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Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV.
1596, 1640 (2010).
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See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 726–27 (2012) (explaining that counterspeech can achieve the government’s interest without resorting to censorship).
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individualized nature.99 As a result, social regulation of speech
eliminates the requirement that all speech acts meet the approval of a majority of the polity. It rejects making the right of
free speech subject to government approval, and thus does not
premise the right of free expression on one’s membership in the
dominant discourse community.100 Social regulation of speech
does still favor speech rooted in the dominant discourse community, but is to be preferred over government regulation because of its partial nature. It has the ability to only partially restrict speech rooted in minority discourses. This allows room
for minority forms of expression in alternative fora and reserves
to individuals multiple avenues for self-expression. Given the
centrality of self-expression to authentic freedom and the actualization of identity, the preservation of avenues for selfrealization is a central requirement for a pluralistic democracy
composed of rational autonomous beings. The partial and open
nature of social sanctions allows greater space for the selfexpression of minorities than would more centralized determinations of the worth of various methods of self-expression and
actualization.
III. MECHANISMS OF THE SOCIAL REGULATION OF OFFENSIVE
SPEECH

This section of the article discusses the mechanisms of
the social regulation of offensive speech in the U.S, and the
negative side effects of social regulation in an era of social media.
A. Community Pressures on Corporations
As discussed above, U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence presupposes that free speech ideals are best advanced by
the decentralized social regulation of offensive speech.101 While
this may originally have been constructed as an expectation
that individuals would close their ears or turn the channel when
faced with speech they found distasteful,102 it has operated far
differently in practice. Social regulation of offensive speech has
developed a distinct and often collective mechanism of en99

See id. at 726–27.
Post, supra note 72, at 130.
101
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
102
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (partially justifying according
free speech protection to vulgarities on an individual’s jacket by noting that those
offended could “simply” avert their eyes).
100

18

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

forcement—market pressures on corporations—that has transformed it into something much more than individual avoidance, though still less than criminal sanctions. When individuals or political figures express ideas or use language that members of a given community find offensive, social regulation increasingly targets the organizations with which the offender is
affiliated.103 While individual complaints may have little effect,
communities within society are often successful in using boycotts and protests to persuade corporations and other organizations to impose economic sanctions on those who violate social
norms of communication and civility, often by fining or firing
the offenders. Thus, social regulation of speech is not synonymous with non-regulation, but rather reflects a preference for
regulation that employs less comprehensive sanctions than government regulation—community mediated economic sanctions
rather than nationwide criminal sanctions.
The prevalence of social media means that ordinary
people have far more widespread and efficient avenues for demanding social and economic sanctioning of speech than in
previous eras; the nature and extent of the sanctions, however,
vary in accordance with the nature of the speech and the wealth
and social class of the speaker. Recent examples of the social
censoring of speech discussed in online news sources, while not
comprehensive,104 suggest that social regulation acts upon three
types of disfavored speech—speech that can be censored,
speech that is contested, and speech that can be discredited.
1. Speech That Can be Censored
For speech to be considered censorable, there generally
must exist a widespread consensus that the speech is socially
unacceptable and sanctionable. Speech in this category is most
akin to what is commonly known as “hate speech.”105 It is publicly stigmatized and considered harmful across a wide range of
speakers of different races, ethnicities, and religious or political
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See, e.g., Severson, supra note 5; see also Jenkins, supra note 7.
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ideologies.106 The racial slurs used by individuals on social media are a classic example of censorable speech, as are slurs
against women, religious minorities, and, increasingly, the
LGBTQ community.
For example, Curt Schilling, former World Seriespitcher-turned-ESPN-analyst, shared a post on Facebook that
showed an overweight transgender man in a wig with a caption
that read “LET HIM IN! to the restroom with your daughter or
else you’re a narrow-minded, judgmental, unloving racist bigot
who needs to die.”107 Schilling added the comment, “A man is
a man no matter what they call themselves. I don’t care what
they are, who they sleep with, men’s room was designed for the
penis, women’s not so much. Now you need laws telling us differently? Pathetic.”108 The post and comment generated intense
criticism, causing ESPN to release a statement defining itself as
an inclusive company and noting that Schilling had been
fired.109 In another incident, a Michigan firefighter lost his job
after calling an African American woman a “b****” and a
“n*****” on Facebook and telling her to go back to the fields.110
In addition, the communications director of an internet company was fired after an outcry on social media over a tweet that
read, “Going to Africa. Hope I don't get AIDS. Just kidding.
I'm white!”111 While public figures, like Curt Schilling, have
long been subject to social regulation of their speech, it is only
recently that social media platforms have rendered the speech
of non-public figures visible enough to become an object of social regulation.
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The social costs of using censored speech are generally
extremely high, as economic losses are often compounded by
social stigma. The strength and dominance of the social norms
that sanction censorable speech force most speakers to recant
immediately, though many are still relegated to the fringes of
society even after apologizing. (Though, as always, money and
social class can brunt the effect of social sanctions). While stigma and loss of one’s livelihood are materially different from the
government’s ability to criminalize this type of speech, they are
nevertheless significant sanctions, and have had a dramatic effect on actual speech practices in the U.S. The long, embarrassing history of racism in America, and the relative newness of
meaningful racial progress, have made racist hate speech one of
the most visible objects of social censorship. However, the political gains and power of LGBTQ rights groups and women’s
rights groups mean that sexist, homophobic, and transphobic
speech are increasingly drawing community ire.112 Indeed, concern over the expansion of the categories of censorable speech
is often considered to have been a factor in the 2016 electoral
victory of Donald Trump.113
2. Speech That is Contested
Sometimes, however, the social regulation of offensive
speech is partial and inconsistent, because the offensiveness of
the speech is contested, the speaker is privileged, or some other
countervailing consideration demands forbearance. I call this
category of speech contested speech, for there are competing
discourse communities with contrasting interpretations of the
sanctionability of the speech. In the paradigmatic case, one
community views the speech as censorable hate speech, while
another views the speech as valuable and legitimate political
discourse. As a result, the sanctioning of the contested speech
will vary across fora, in accordance with the relative power and
visibility of the contesting communities in each forum.
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See, e.g., Seth McLaughlin, Trump Apologizes for ‘Locker Room Banter’ After Past Recordings Emerge, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016),
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The current social disagreement over the Black Lives
Matter and anthem protests 115 are an example of contested
speech. A significant portion of Americans believe that the
Black Lives Matter movement is the new frontier of civil rights
and that the anthem protests are an important nonviolent
means of drawing attention to the social injustices resulting
from police brutality.116 At the same time, an equally significant
portion of Americans believe that the Black Lives Matter
movement is a hate movement that advocates violence against
police officers, that the anthem protests disparage veterans, and
that both are part of a larger ploy to destabilize America. 117
This has created an atmosphere of social regulation that is
somewhat schizophrenic. For example, when the Women’s Na114
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tional Basketball Association (WNBA) teams Phoenix Mercury, Indiana Fever, and New York Liberty appeared for games
in plain black warmup shirts in support of the Black Lives Matter movement, 118 a significant portion of the U.S. population
was offended and felt that they should be penalized.119 However, when the players were fined by the WNBA for their actions,
the angry outcry from an equally significant portion of the population led to the fines being withdrawn.120 Similarly, when a
group of 11- and 12-year-old members of a youth football team
in Beaumont, Texas chose to kneel for the national anthem as a
way of protesting police brutality, numerous individuals in the
community were outraged and death threats were issued
against the young players.121 The executive board of the team
allegedly responded by stating that any Beaumont Bulls player
who chose to kneel at subsequent games would be suspended
from the team. 122 This response produced its own backlash,
which led to that threat being withdrawn. 123 However, the
Bulls’ head coach was nevertheless dismissed for the remainder
of the season.124
The protests for and against professorial candidate Steven Salaita reflect a similar dynamic, entailing not only contested content, but also a speaker considered privileged. After
being offered a tenured faculty job at University of Illinois at
Urbana Champaign (UIUC), Steven Salaita wrote various
tweets considered by many to be anti-Semitic, such as “Zionists: transforming ‘anti-semitism’ from something horrible into
something honorable since 1948.”125 The tweets led to an outpouring of opposition from students, faculty, and donors at
UIUC. 126 These individuals and groups believed that Salaita
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was anti-Semitic and thus unfit to teach UIUC students, some
of whom are Jewish. 127 After consideration of the various
comments, threats, and communications, UIUC revoked Steven Salaita’s offer of employment.128 The revocation of the job
offer led to another outcry, motivated in part by concerns for
academic freedom and breach of contract. 129 As a result, the
America Association of University Professors added UIUC to
its list of censured universities, 130 while UIUC paid Salaita
$600,000 as part of a settlement agreement.131 The public censure of the university by other organizations in society and the
large settlement suggest that Salaita’s speech was contested rather than clearly censorable.
3. Speech That Can be Discredited
A third category of speech is discreditable speech. Discreditable speech is generally condemned for its lack of concern
for individuals or groups rather than for its promotion of hate
toward individuals or groups. In essence, discreditable speech is
speech that critics believe displays high levels of ignorance or
callousness toward the plight of victimized or marginalized
groups. Given that sins of omission are often treated less severely than sins of commission, it would not be surprising to find
social regulation of speech making a sharp distinction between
censorable speech and discreditable speech—between hate
speech and insensitive speech. However, the racial and political
fault lines triggered by the Obama presidency and the increased
coverage of hate speech in the aftermath of Trump’s campaign
have resulted in the line between censorable and discreditable
speech becoming increasingly blurred. For example, a paradigmatic case of discreditable speech occurred in 2013, when a
twenty-two year old posted Halloween pictures of herself
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dressed as a victim of the Boston Marathon bombing.132 With
the bombing itself still fresh in the memories of the nation and
the victims, the condemnation was almost immediate. The
tweeter lost her job and received innumerable threats of death
and violence. 133 Two years later, a less paradigmatic incident
occurred, also over Halloween attire. A Yale faculty member
sent an email to students, arguing that college students should
be permitted to wear racially offensive costumes.134 While the
university expressed support for the teacher,135 many students
and other faculty viewed the email as additional damning evidence of the racial insensitivity of the Ivy League, and they engaged in direct protests that ultimately led the teacher to resign.136 More recently, students at Claremont McKenna College
physically barred speaker Heather MacDonald from her assigned campus venue, as her “War on Cops” arguments were
viewed as discounting the importance of black lives.137
The current trend toward strong social regulation of contested and discreditable speech, in addition to hate speech,
greatly complicates the issue of speech regulation. For while the
active malice of hate speech seems to argue for regulation, bad
intent is generally not nearly so clear in cases of contested
speech and discredited speech. This suggests that while U.S.
First Amendment law has maintained its “level down” approach, by denying everyone the honor and respect that once
attended noble birth,138 many engaged in the social regulation
of speech are seeking to level up—striving to secure for every132
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one, but particularly for marginalized groups, the honor and
respect traditionally accorded to the high born. These two aims
are opposed to each other, and must be balanced in some way if
social regulation of speech is to be effective.
B. Direct Regulation By Corporations
Another form of social regulation of speech is direct regulation by social media corporations, which serve as an increasingly large forum for public expression.139 While social regulation of speech is often initiated by communities to enforce
community speech standards, in direct regulation, corporations
themselves create corporate standards to govern the type of
speech that can be used on their social media platforms.140 First
Amendment protections that insulate offensive speech from
government regulation in traditional public fora do not apply to
privately owned social media platforms.141 Thus, all three major
social media forums—Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—have
written policies that authorize the censoring of hate speech.142
Facebook reserves the right to censor speech that “directly attacks people based on their race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, sex, gender, or gender identity, or serious disabilities or diseases.”143 Twitter prohibits its
users from engaging in hateful conduct, defined as “promot[ing] violence against or directly attack[ing] or threaten[ing]
other people on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin,
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sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, religious affiliation,
age, disability, or disease.” 144 Similarly, YouTube prohibits
“content that promotes violence or hatred against individuals or
groups based on certain attributes, such as race or ethnic origin,
religion, disability, gender, age, veteran status, sexual orientation/gender identity.”145
These hate speech codes partially reflect the reality that
social media companies are global platforms. Whatever the local U.S. standard, the global standard, as reflected in the EU
online conduct code adopted by Facebook, Twitter, YouTube,
and Microsoft in May, 2016,146 is the centralized regulation of
hate speech. Thus, the speech codes adopted by U.S. social
media companies increasingly reflect global (legal) rather than
local (social) approaches to hate speech.147 Moreover, with the
rising use of privately owned social media—70% of U.S. adults
use Facebook for expressive communication 148 —the First
Amendment increasingly operates as a ban only on certain enforcement mechanisms (criminal penalties and fines), rather
than as a ban on censorship itself. The remedies available to
social media companies—-removal of posts, banning from the
forum—do not violate the First Amendment,149 despite constituting overt censorship, nor do attempts to impose community
norms of communication through corporate fines and the loss
of private employment.150 The First Amendment operates only
to prohibit the use of the wide-ranging power of the government
to police speech, but leaves other avenues of speech policing
144
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open. 151 Thus, people wishing to establish community speech
norms can still do so; however, they must appeal to a corporation’s self-interest, not to their legislator’s fiduciary obligations.
C. Side Effects of the Social Regulation of Offensive Speech
This section discusses the ways in which the actual social regulation of offensive speech departs from the theory of
social speech regulation discussed in Section II. Whereas Section II summarized the idealized and theoretical benefits of relying on the social regulation of offensive speech, this section
considers the side effects that limit, and in some ways undermine, those benefits.
As mentioned in Section II, a key strength of the social
regulation of speech is that it benefits self-government and
truth-seeking by preventing the government from controlling
the “truths” citizens are permitted to hear.152 Social regulation,
unlike government regulation, leaves room for speakers who
are criticized or censored by one group to merely migrate to a
different platform and a different group—allowing the idea continued access to the “marketplace.” This strength of social regulation also functions as a huge weakness, for one effect of this
migration in an era of tailored social media has been the creation of closed communities of like-minded people, cut off from
the wider marketplace of ideas.153 For example, after Curt Schilling was dismissed from ESPN, a platform with bipartisan appeal, he found new employment as a political commentator for
Breitbart154—a forum with a much more ideologically homogenous audience. Thus, rather than permitting the fullest range of
discussion and deliberation of ideas, decentralization often increases the polarization of society, by creating multiple segregated discourse communities, completely and deliberately disengaged from one another. 155 This phenomenon has become
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increasingly evident across social and traditional media platforms. The polarized nature of Twitter discussions156 and the
lack of dialogue between readers of CNN and readers of Fox
News are well documented. 157 Thus, while social censorship
allows for the possibility of the robust exchange of ideas
through a bustling marketplace, the reality is often one in which
self-censoring interacts with corporate censoring to create intracommunity ideological hegemony, making national reasoning
and deliberation across communities extremely difficult, if not
impossible.
In addition, the strengths of social regulation of offensive speech assume that private censors cannot “blanket” the
market, but this assumption is increasingly false. While modern
America has come a long way from the days in which two entities, the government and the church, controlled the avenues of
mass communication through licensing requirements,158 control
of communicative media in today’s United States is only slightly more decentralized. A mere six companies control ninetypercent of the U.S. media,159 and the Constitution places no restraints on their ability to censor speakers and messages.160 This
has resulted in numerous high profile accusations of corporate
censorship believed to be harmful to the democratic process.
For instance, in 1998, Fox News was accused of censoring reports that revealed issues with the widespread use of Bovine
Growth Hormone.161 In 2004, Sinclair Broadcasting refused to
allow ABC affiliates to air a Nightline episode that listed the

tomi-lahren-backlash-interview-racism-trump-953715 (discussing Trevor Noah’s
response to backlash from liberals when he invited a conservative talk show personality onto his show).
156
Marc A. Smith et. al., Mapping Twitter Topic Networks: From Polarized Crowds to
Community Clusters, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/20/mapping-twitter-topic-networks-frompolarized-crowds-to-community-clusters/.
157
Shanto Iyenger & Richard Morin, Red Media, Blue Media, WASH. POST (May 3,
2006, 6:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/03/AR2006050300865.html.
158
LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 6 (1985).
159
Ashley Lutz, These Six Corporations Control 90% of the Media in America, BUS. INSIDER (June. 14, 2012, 9:49 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/these-6corporations-control-90-of-the-media-in-america-2012-6 (noting that the six companies are Comcast, News Corp, Disney, Viacom, Time Warner, and CBS).
160
Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism of
Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 330 (1999) (“[P]rivate censorship is not subject to
judicial review.”).
161
William A. Wines & Terence J. Lau, Can You Hear Me Now?—Corporate Censorship
and Its Troubling Implications for the First Amendment, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 119, 145
(2005).

2018]

THEY SHOULD BE FIRED

29

names and photos of service members killed in Iraq, allegedly
out of concern that it would decrease support for the Iraq war,
which the Sinclair CEO supported. 162 Censorship of anti-war
views was also behind the decision by Cumulus and Cox
Communications, who owned hundreds of radio stations, to
prevent the airing of songs by the Dixie Chicks, due to the lead
singer’s criticisms of then-President George Bush.163 Similarly,
Disney prohibited affiliate Miramax from disseminating the
film Fahrenheit 9/11 for fear that its criticism of the Bush family
would imperil Disney’s tax cuts in Florida, governed by Jeb
Bush.164 The censorship by these conglomerates did not merely
drive the unwanted speech to another platform; in many cases,
it silenced the speech in ways every bit as far-reaching as government censorship. Moreover, it is far from clear that the decisions to censor were credible instances of social regulation—
defined as flowing from the judgment of the community—
rather than bare corporate censorship based on profit motives.
Thus, while independent, decentralized decisions to censor content due to offense or conflicts of interest need not undermine
informed self-government, the concentration of radio, television, and newspaper ownership in a few hands allows precisely
the sort of information control that the First Amendment seeks
to prohibit. Allowing six CEOs to control what Americans see
and hear, to pick and choose which political ideas Americans
should be exposed to and which current events they should be
informed about, seems as inimical, if not more inimical, to selfgovernment and truth-seeking than control of such issues by the
ruling majority. For while this ideological hegemony is not
governmentally imposed, it nevertheless works to undermine
the central purpose of the First Amendment and to block the
benefits that would otherwise flow from the choice of private
censorship over governmental censorship. As McChesney, a
communications professor at the University of Illinois-UC, has
noted, “the public’s right to hear a variety of voices and properly digest their messages is the central platform of a democracy,”
and “[a] popular Government without popular information or
the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy or perhaps both.”165
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The ideal of social regulation of offensive speech is further complicated by the finite nature of time. More speech may
well be better, but the more ideas the public must evaluate
across the same span of time, the less time is afforded to the
evaluation of each idea. Every idea presupposes some truth
about the world, but if individual listeners lack the time or engagement to investigate these underlying truths, they will rely
on shorthands, such as speaker or source, as proxies for facticity. When this speaker truth is combined with the prevalence
of closed communities, however, rational self-governance
flounders. A statement becomes hateful because it was proffered by Fox News and neutral because it was reported by
CNN. Thus, nonpartisan evaluation of language and even critiques of facticity becomes impossible, if not obsolete, creating
a marketplace in which truth is purely subjective and always
political—a truth-seeking marketplace in which there is no
truth. Arguably, this state of the market has already arrived.
President Trump routinely calls news with which he disagrees
“fake news[,]”166 a designation widely accepted by his supporters. 167 Moreover, his spokeswoman, Kellyanne Conway, has
coined the term “alternative facts,” which appears to presuppose the existence of conservative truths that directly contradict
liberal truths.168 Thus, the labels “true” and “fact” are increasingly serving as shorthand affirmations of a speaker’s politics,
rather than as rational evaluations of an underlying reality. This
bifurcation of truth value and content fatally undermines the
utility of the market place of ideas as a vehicle of rational selfgovernance.
Lastly, the unstructured social regulation revealed in the
examples in Section III is in many ways incompatible with the
autonomy ideal that lies at the core of self-expression and self-
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government. Unstructured social regulation can offer speakers
only two things—communal goodwill (the community abstains
from interfering with one’s expression) or communal hindrance
(the community interferes with one’s expression). Thus, unstructured social regulation makes the speaker’s autonomy depend on another’s goodwill, which is indistinguishable from
making the speaker subject to another’s dominion. 169 In this
view, autonomy that exists only because of another’s beneficence, which they can withdraw at any moment, is not autonomy at all.170 It is benign dominion.171 Such dominion, however
benign, is a denial of autonomy.172 It is questionable whether
any kind of freedom of expression can exist when anyone, for
any reason, at any time can take away another’s livelihood in
retaliation for her speech. This is not a call to give the government the power to take away one’s liberty in retaliation for
one’s speech, but rather to suggest that social regulation of
speech must be coupled with the legal protection of autonomy.
Thus, this is a call for non-dominating social regulation of
speech.
The next section addresses one way in which the nation
and society could move closer to a regime of social regulation
of speech that is non-dominating. This approach is an incremental and ultimately partial approach, but nevertheless represents a necessary step in securing freedom of speech in an era of
closed local communities, nationalized social media communities, and daily corporate imposition of economic speech sanctions.
IV. NON-DOMINATING SOCIAL REGULATION OF SPEECH
The problems that flow from the social regulation of offensive speech inhere mainly in its implementation rather than
in its theory. Allowing communities and individuals to enforce
their own standards of free speech, short of imprisonment and
financial ruin, can enhance commitments to pluralism, deliberation, and public reasoning. However, the effectiveness and
worth of this enforcement is dependent on the nature of the
community regulating the speech and the existence of legal pro-
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tections against domination. There is undoubtedly a plurality of
ways one could seek to create a speech community committed
to civility, tolerance and public deliberation, as well as numerous ways one could protect citizens against domination. The
approach endorsed by this article, however, is one as old as
American democracy itself—the development of an educated
citizenry. As Jefferson noted, when citizens engage in actions
which suggest they are not “enlightened enough to exercise
their control with wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to
take it from them, but to inform their discretion.”173 Thus, the
remedy for unstructured social regulation which injures autonomy is not government regulation, but rather improvement of
the operation of social regulation through citizen education. In
the U.S., the bulk of citizen education takes place in public
schools and universities. Thus, it is in these places that we must
seek to impart the skills necessary for non-dominating social
regulation. This requires a significant revision in the way the
First Amendment is applied to speech in public schools and
universities.
The Supreme Court has suggested that restrictions on
the First Amendment rights of public school students requires a
showing that the speech would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.’” 174 Later, however, it narrowed this
ruling in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier175 by applying a
nonpublic forum analysis which held that “educators do not
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”176 These days, it is generally accepted that public schools may censor speech that is “indecent,”177 disruptive,178 that promotes illegal behavior,179 or that
violates the rights of other students.180 The rationale for allowing such censorship in public schools is the need for public
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schools to model the type of public discourse necessary in a diverse democratic political order. 181 While this may be the goal
of permitting such censorship in the public schools, in application it is often a bare exercise in domination, which has helped
promote a culture of social regulation as domination. This article suggests that the analysis of free speech violations in a public school should not end with the question of whether the
speech was disruptive, but should also include consideration of
whether the school’s response was an exercise in domination.
If First Amendment values include autonomy, it cannot be
enough that the speech regulation eliminated the disruptive behavior. Such a regulation, for both constitutional and pedagogical purposes, must also be designed to promote public reasoning, civility, and dialogue. This means that a school could not
ban a Christian student from wearing a t-shirt opposing homosexuality, unless such an action was part of a larger effort to
promote dialogue and authentic engagement with opposing
views. 182 The question of speech in the context of education
must go beyond silencing or tolerance, and must address engagement. Engagement, like most aspects of democratic citizenship, is not imbibed with mother’s milk. It must be taught.
Unfortunately, what few attempts there are to teach
tolerance and civility in the public schools are often frustrated
by the continuing racial and ethnic segregation of these schools.
For example, white students typically attend schools that are
75% white, and they have the least exposure to other races of
any group. 183 Similarly, African-American and Hispanic students overwhelmingly attend schools comprised almost entirely
of their racial/ethnic group. 184 School segregation, combined
with residential segregation, thus ensures that many students
are not exposed to viewpoints and perspectives significantly different from their own until they reach college.185 As a result, for
many students, practical lessons in civil discourse across differences are incapable of being apprehended until they arrive at a
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university and are finally exposed to high degrees of cultural,
religious, and political diversity. However, the point in their
education when civil discourse rooted in tolerance of divergent
views could be most meaningfully taught and is most necessary,
is also the point at which such efforts are most likely to be prohibited by the Constitution. Following the rule set forth in
R.A.V. v. St. Paul,186 courts have held that attempts by universities to cope with the rise in racist incidents that have attended
increased campus diversity (through campus speech codes 187 )
are unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.188
This observation is not an endorsement of wholesale
government regulation of offensive speech at all levels of society, but rather a suggestion that a middle ground that permits
regulation of offensive speech on public university campuses is
needed. In Bethel School District v. Fraser,189 the Supreme Court
noted that:
[The] fundamental values of “habits and manners of civility” essential to a democratic society must,
of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious
views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular. But
these “fundamental values” must
also take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others,
and, in the case of a school, the
sensibilities of fellow students. The
undoubted freedom to advocate
unpopular and controversial views
in schools and classrooms must be
balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
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appropriate behavior. Even the
most heated political discourse in a
democratic society requires consideration for the personal sensibilities
of the other participants and audiences.190
Currently, it is unclear when students can learn these fundamentals values. If their public schools are too homogenous, and
their diverse public universities are prohibited from restricting
offensive speech, must their first introduction to “the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior” be the increasingly common dismissal from their employment? It is easy to argue that
the loan officer and the firefighter should have known better.
However, if their first introduction to diversity was a college
campus where such speech was enabled and where sanctions
for racial slurs and sexist epithets were constitutionally forbidden, at what point were they to have learned the self-restraint so
essential for reasoned public deliberation in a diverse polity?
There is much to condemn in the recent campus protests attempting to completely silence controversial views, 191 but the
question must be asked, at which point in their public school
and university careers were students taught skills of disagreement without domination?
The problem of the 21st century, like the problem of the
20th century, remains the color line, and students continue to
be taught directly by their parents, or indirectly through their
segregated schools and neighborhoods, that there is a racial hierarchy within which some lives matter more than others. The
time for continuing to deny this reality is long past. Colleges
and universities remain, for many students, the first places in
which they are actually exposed to the true diversity of the
marketplace of ideas. They are also spaces in which domination
along axes of race and ideology become most tempting. If there
are any skills for navigating that marketplace and resisting that
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temptation, college offers the last best chance for students to
learn them.
Thus, rather than constantly striking down speech codes
at public universities as inconsistent with the First Amendment,
this article urges that courts instead allow hate speech regulations in colleges and universities that promote non-domination,
civil dialogue, and public reasoning. Such an exception to a
blanket ban on governmental regulation of hate speech is warranted in light of the unique and central role public universities
play in the creation of an educated citizenry. It takes time to
create a citizenry capable of non-dominating social regulation
of speech, and the court must not handicap the very institutions
to which we have entrusted that task by assuming their task is
complete before it has even begun. For the same reason, however, the penalties for violating such codes should not be expulsion or suspension. Rather, colleges and universities should
treat violations of their speech codes as failures of sympathy192
and adopt “penalties” that promote dialogue and connection,
such as community service or multicultural education. These
approaches are likely to be particularly helpful in the context of
contested and discreditable speech, as the case for malicious
intent is much less pronounced in those instances. However,
though victims may disagree, these penalties are also likely to
be appropriate in the contexts of censorable speech, for the
premise of university education is that students are still capable
of learning and unlearning. Though bare censorship might silence the offensive speaker, only engagement on equal footing
with the disparaged groups offers a meaningful possibility that
the earlier feelings of disparagement might become respect for a
fellow citizen. This is especially needed given that many students are members of both majority and minority groups—i.e.
African-Americans Christians or European-American homosexuals—and thus do not fall into an easy binary of oppressed
and oppressor.
While this article proposes a shift in penalties, it is, nevertheless, still a vote in favor of regulation of speech on college
campuses, a position that will be anathema to many. However,
it is important to remember not only the higher educational
mission of universities, which cannot be realized without
192

See Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality in THE PHILOSO241, 254 (Patrick Hayden ed., 2001) (explaining sympathy as
“an increasing ability to see the similarities between ourselves and people very unlike
us as outweighing the differences,” where the relevant similarities are ordinary everyday things like loving our parents).
PHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS

2018]

THEY SHOULD BE FIRED

37

speech regulation, but also that speech is never completely
“free” in practice. The idealized regime in which offensive
speech has no consequences and individuals are completely free
from external pressures to comply with hegemonic norms of
civil discourse does not and has never existed under any version
of the First Amendment. Social regulation of offensive speech
has always been permitted in some form in U.S. society. The
goal is to move such regulation from dysfunction and closer to
the ideal. Thus, allowing campuses to regulate speech in ways
that promote non-domination will not create some sui generis
exception for hate speech sanctions, but rather will allow public
colleges and universities to better equip students to be full participants in a civil society that has increasingly recognized and
taken steps to prevent, the real world harms of offensive speech.
It will equip them to do that in a way that has less cost for the
overall autonomy of speakers in society.
V. CONCLUSION
The rise of Donald Trump in the 2016 election cycle
highlights the challenges that arise when a nation’s commitment to popular regulation of speech outstrips the ability of its
populace to engage in dialogue and deliberation across difference.193 Free speech protections without a corresponding commitment to fostering dialogue and tolerance incentivizes lowcontent speech at the expense of the informationally rich speech
so essential to self-governance.194 The result is that in polarized
elections, an increasingly common state of affairs, arguments in
the public debate become increasingly based on prejudice rather
than on reason—until prejudice itself becomes a reason.
The insight of the founding generations in perceiving
speech as the guardian of democracy was not misplaced, but
the speech they had in mind was speech within a context of
public debate and reason, not speech for silencing and intimidation. The benefits of making the people the guardians of public
deliberation are very real, but the public must be taught to be
guardians. Citizens bring to the voting booth and public deliberation the knowledge and skills they acquired during the
course of their education. We as a nation must ensure that that
education includes not merely the ability to consume static in-
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formation through literacy and numeracy skills, but also the
skills needed to engage in the dynamic and instantaneous
communicative practices in a pluralistic society in ways that
respect others’ autonomy and that promote non-domination.

